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Gazing over the horizon
Will an equitable Green Climate Fund 
allocation policy be significant for the 
Pacific post-2020?
Abstract: The establishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) has increased 
expectations and optimism among developing countries, especially those that 
are particularly vulnerable to climate change. The GCF aims to channel a 
significant portion of global funds for climate change response, with a goal of 
reaching US$100 billion per year by 2020. Its broad allocation policy increases 
the possibility that particularly vulnerable countries which have struggled to 
access international climate finance will continue to face such challenges. 
Adopting an equitable/fair principle of allocation, this article highlights a 
number of scenarios on the possible impact of the post-2020 climate financ-
ing environment on particularly vulnerable countries with a special focus on 
the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS). This study argues that 
PSIDS are extremely sensitive to GCF allocation mechanisms. While the 
study supports the notion of balanced allocation as currently advanced by 
the GCF, the precarious situation of PSIDS necessitates a re-think of how the 
GCF finance is to be allocated in the future.
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THE ESTABLISHMENT of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in 2010 to mobilise climate finance to developing countries received a lot of fanfare and positive accolades from the world media and world leaders (Row- 
ling, 2012, Azevedo, 2017). The GCF has been referred to as  unique (Kumar 
2017), a ‘game changer’ (Countries pledge $9.3bn, 2014), the world’s largest 
(Arkin, 2018) and premium multilateral climate fund (Friends of the Earth, 
2014), and the primary channel which will deliver a significant portion of the 
2020, US$100 billion global climate finance goal to developing countries. The 
GCF՚s purpose is to not only support country-owned, ambitious and innovative 
climate actions that will limit global emissions and enhance resilience of deve- 
loping countries (GCF, 2018a; UNDP, 2018), but also to correct the ‘inequality of 
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climate finance distributions’ that many developing countries have been arguing 
as being unfair (Harvey, 2014). 
Donors have pledged an ambitious US$10.2 billion to the GCF by 2018 
and additional contributions are expected through the GCF to reach US$100 
billion by 2020. The GCF has also been used as a platform by donor countries to 
showcase their global commitment to the fight against climate change, attracting 
showers of praise from developing countries and the media alike. Because of 
the ambitious cause that it advances and its promise of big money, the GCF has 
been portrayed and viewed by developing countries, especially the Pacific Small 
Island Developing States (PSIDS) as a ‛timely saviour’ for their climate finance 
needs (GCF, 2017). The GCF has to a larger extent been presented to developing 
countries as the solution to their climate change problem; an infinite source of 
climate finance. The GCF has become synonymous with the term climate finance.
However, a critical evaluation of the current GCF allocation policy has 
highlighted that such a portrayal does not withstand close inspection. While the 
resources directed to the GCF are substantial, there is concern that its current 
allocation policy, which advances a geographically balanced approach (GCF, 
2014) may seriously disadvantage particularly vulnerable countries. Under the 
GCF, particularly vulnerable countries consist of the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Africa. Such open-ended 
allocation policies can further marginalise particularly vulnerable countries which 
have struggled to access predictable finance from multilateral climate funds. It 
does little to solve the current problem of the ad hoc, inadequate and donor-driven 
flow of climate finance into such countries. Sporadic inflows of finance further 
exacerbate countries’ vulnerability and reduce their resilience to climate change 
(Maclellan, 2011). Effectively addressing climate change impacts will require 
long-term support, but such support cannot be planned or implemented without 
a degree of certainty about funding availability (Müller, 2013).
The need to bring the GCF allocation policies to the fore in public discourse 
stems from the race for accreditation1 that is underway among developing coun-
tries (Samuwai & Hills, 2018). The perception of future big money flowing into 
the GCF has prompted developing countries to mobilise significant national 
resources to strengthen their institutional capacities so that they can gain ac-
creditation with the GCF and directly access its resources by 2020 and beyond. 
The uncertainty of the availability of funding underlines the importance for 
the GCF to start considering how well/best to allocate its funding in the future 
so that all developing countries will benefit and that no one will be left behind. 
The GCF is facing uncertainties in terms of its replenishment. At the current rate 
of projects approval (as of September 2018), the GCF is very close to triggering 
its first replenishment cycle but its ‘chaotic’ governance performance has been 
criticised by many donors as a potential hindrance to the scaling up of their future 
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pledges. This uncertainty is exacerbated further by the withdrawal of the United 
States, a major global donor, from the Paris Agreement.
The uncertainties of GCF funding should be a major concern for particularly 
vulnerable countries which are actively seeking direct access to the GCF as the 
process of accessing the GCF is also challenging and complex (GCF, 2018b; 
Samuwai & Hills, 2018). The recent independent review of the GCF readiness 
program has indicated that the programme has so far shown least effect to the 
particular vulnerable countries and also that direct access, despite being priori-
tised for such countries, has been limited (GCF, 2018b).
The challenges surrounding particularly vulnerable countries accessing the 
GCF funding is further complicated by the recent findings of the special report 
on global warming of 1.50C by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). The special report is clear that the consequences of 1.50C warming (and 
over) would be extreme and existential for particularly vulnerable countries 
(IPCC, 2018). A 10 year window has been estimated before warming reaches 
the 1.50C threshold (IPCC, 2018). Thus, in light of these alarming findings, fa-
cilitating ease of access to adequate and predictable climate finance from sources 
(including the GCF) for particular developing countries has never been greater.
The Pacific situation
Scattered over the largest ocean in the world, the PSIDS are at the front line 
of climate change (Robie & Chand 2017), but their voice is absent from main-
stream climate finance literature (Dreher & Voyer 2015, Wing, 2017). Existing 
academic climate finance studies tend to aggregate the PSIDS’ unique situa-
tions with those of the larger Asian countries in the Asia-Pacific region, result-
ing in the drowning of PSIDS voices (Maclellan, 2011). Without discounting 
the climate change realities of other particularly vulnerable countries, fair at-
tention to the PSIDS climate finance needs is warranted because some PSIDS 
are now facing threats to their existence. 
A total of 15 PSIDS—Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), 
Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), 
Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu—have 
signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Accessing predictable and adequate adaptation finance is the priority of 
PSIDS, due to their topography. The amount of adaptation climate finance chan-
nelled to the PSIDS is relatively modest compared with that allocated to other 
developing countries and is largely ad hoc in nature (Durand, Schalatek et al., 
2015, Atteridge & Canales, 2017). Of the US$1.3 billion allocated for the Asia-
Pacific region, only 4.6 percent was channelled to PSIDS (Barnard, Nakhooda 
et al., 2015). Bilateral agencies are the main sources of finance in the region. 
Accessing quality and predictable finance from multilateral climate funds is a 
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constant challenge for the PSIDS due to their chronic capacity constraints. In 
addition, the total climate finance received is diluted as a significant portion 
of the amount (~8 percent to 20 percent) is deducted as management fees by 
international accredited entities such as the UNDP, World Bank and Asia De-
velopment Bank which accessed these funds on the PSIDS’ behalf (Atteridge 
& Canales, 2017). 
Due to their very small population, PSIDS are regarded as the highest recipi-
ent of climate finance on a per capita basis. However, critics have argued that this 
fact can be misleading as it does not reflect PSIDS realities (Dirix, Peeters et al. 
2012). PSIDS are scattered across 15 percent of the globe’s surface and are some 
of the remotest countries from major global markets, making the mobilisation of 
climate finance challenging and very costly (The World Bank, 2017). PSIDS have 
not been able to access their fair share of climate finance, which has exacerbated 
their already extreme vulnerability (Maclellan, 2011a).
For its part, the GCF has ramped up its effort to mobilise climate finance to 
the PSIDS and is co-financing nine major projects in the Pacific, accounting for 
US$296 million, which accounts for 8 percent of the GCF funding portfolio. 
However, it is still highly uncertain how the PSIDS will fare in future GCF dis-
bursement cycles under a geographical balance allocation policy. There is great 
uncertainty as to whether PSIDS can continue to secure significant financing 
from the GCF in light of other developing countries’ growing climate change 
needs. So far, only the Cook Islands, Fiji and Federated States of Micronesia are 
the PSIDS which have been accredited by the GCF for direct access.
The high degree of uncertainty over future funding access to the GCF should 
motivate the PSIDS to engage the GCF to initiate constructive discussions on 
the need for a concrete yet fair allocation policy to ensure predictable funding. 
In light of PSIDS circumstances, the ideal GCF allocation criteria would be one 
that resulted in predictable finance to meet the PSIDS’ immediate and long-term 
needs (Maclellan & Meads, 2016).
Justification for equitable/fair allocation of adaptation finance
According to the seminal work of John Rawls, fairness is synonymous with the 
concept of equity (Rawls, 1958). Thus, the push for equity as the basis of adap- 
tation finance allocation is driven by the idea of ‘restitution’—an obligation that 
needs to be settled as inferred by the polluter pay principle of the UNFCCC 
(Eisenack & Stecker 2012). The absence of a robust allocation policy that takes 
care of special case countries like the PSIDS has resulted in the marginalisation 
of particularly vulnerable countries, underlying the importance of equitable pro-
cesses within the financial mechanisms of the UNFCCC (Müller, 2013). The role 
of equity in climate finance allocation is critical, as noted by (Sokona & Denton 
2001), to ‘assure that vulnerable people in the remotest outposts of the world do 
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not become imprisoned in perennial cycles of destitution and impoverishment at 
the mercy of climate events’ (p. 120). While equity might be a broad and politi-
cally sensitive concept, it is perceived as relevant in the policy discourse around 
the allocation of  adaptation climate finance (Persson & Remling 2014). 
Equity has four general principles: 1) equality, 2) prioritarianism, 3) suffi-
cientarianism and 4) the leximin principle (Persson & Remling 2014). All equity 
principles have merits in the allocation of adaptation finance (Grasso, 2010), but 
this study identified only two as currently being operationalised by multilateral 
climate funds. These are: 1) the equality principle, which demands funds be equally 
distributed to all countries despite their different circumstances (Paavola & Adger 
2006), and 2) the prioritarianism principles, which prioritises funding for those that 
are worse affected by climate change; the most vulnerable (Wolff 1998, Stadel-
mann, Persson et al., 2014). 
These two equity principles are prevalent in the allocation of adaptation 
finance and can be attributed to the different rationale of equity between deve- 
loped (donors) and developing countries (recipients) (Maggioni, 2010). Maggioni 
(2010) argues that the equality principle reflects the argument of developed coun-
tries that there is a limit to resources that can be provided and thus, for fairness 
sake, all eligible countries should get an equal share. Müller (2013) provided 
further support, arguing that treating all eligible countries as equal, despite their 
circumstances, is politically justifiable as it ensures that funding is available to all.
The prioritarianism principle, on the other hand, champions developing 
countries’ preference for channelling adaptation finance to those who really 
need it (Maggioni, 2010). Stadelmann, Persson et al. (2014) supported such a 
stance, stressing that a vulnerable country’s needs should be prioritised and that 
they should be given the bulk of finance (Paavola & Adger, 2006). These ratio- 
nales are based on the unequal vulnerabilities and responsibilities of countries 
in terms of their contributions and sensitivity to climate change (Grasso, 2010). 
Allocating finance on the basis of vulnerability has been strongly criticised as 
it is a political construct (Klein & Möhner 2011, Füssel, Hallegate et al., 2012), is 
difficult to measure and compare (Stadelmann, Persson et al., 2014),  and is subjec-
tive (Barnett, Lambert et al., 2008). Füssel, Hallegate et al., (2012), Müller (2013) 
and Ferreira (2017) have proposed various modified forms of ‘vulnerability’ as 
the basis for allocating adaptation finance. These studies have argued that poverty 
indicators are the best indicators of vulnerability and should be taken into account 
when designing an equitable climate finance allocation framework (Ferreira, 2017).
The method
To illustrate the potential implication of an equity driven GCF allocation policy 
on the PSIDS, this article focuses specifically on the ring fenced provision of 
the GCF adaptation finance. The GCF allocates 50 percent of GCF finance to 
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adaptation and then splits that into two equal portions: LDCs, SIDS and African 
States, and the remaining developing countries (of UNFCCC non-Annex I) cre-
ating an impression of special treatment for particularly vulnerable countries. 
Using the equality and the prioritarianism principle as the basis for allocation, 
this study then formulates relevant allocation indicators to highlight the possible 
futures of GCF adaptation finance for PSIDS post-2020, when the GCF is intend-
ing to be mobilised towards US$100 billion per annum. This paper recognises 
that allocation decisions are complex, value laden and have a political dimension 
(Barr, Frankhauser et al., 2010), thus its aim is to merely highlight how equity-
based GCF allocation decisions for adaptation finance could be significant (or 
not)  in relation to the PSIDS precarious situation. 
• The analysis was conducted assuming five important caveats:
• The  US$100 billion goal each year by 2020 has been achieved;
• The GCF is the primary vehicle of shifting these finances;
• The ring-fenced US$25 billion is ready to be allocated post-2020;
• All countries are able to submit GCF-compliant applications greater 
than the overall GCF limit requiring GCF to determine allocation;
• A total of 97 countries are eligible to access the special funding provi-
sion of the GCF.3
Results 
Pacific Small Island Developing States’ experience can be compared with other 
identified ring-fenced groups in relation to the four allocation criteria (Figure 1). 
It is also important to note that this study by no mean proposes that the PSIDS 
should actually receive the amount derived from these allocation scenarios; it 
rather wants to highlight the unpredictability of flows in light of no concrete and 
clear allocation principles.
From the onset (Figure 1), it is clear that the four allocation bases will signifi-
cantly affect the PSIDS and the wider SIDS. While the allocation amount due to 
the LDCs and the African states also varies, the amount that these countries would 
receive under the four allocation basis ranges well above the US$257 million mark 
(i.e. the amount a country can receive if a per country criteria is used). This seems 
to suggest that LDCs and African states are relatively better off compared with 
PSIDS and SIDS irrespective of the allocation basis used, as the possibilities of 
large scale and predictable finance is highly certain in these countries.
When compared to the wider SIDSs grouping, the sensitivity of the PSIDS 
to the allocation criteria is quite evident. The wider SIDS grouping receives an 
average of US$26 million if allocation were to be made on the basis of popula-
tion, land area and weighted vulnerability. On the other hand the PSIDS exhibit 
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a significant degree of variation in the finance flows when allocation is done on 
the same three bases. The PSIDS average allocation land area is US$24 million. 
This amount decreases by 57 percent if allocation is done on the basis of popula-
tion and 65 percent if allocation is done on the basis of weighted vulnerability. 
It is important to also note that the PSIDS overall data is heavily skewed by 
Papua New Guinea.
The ratio of finances when using the three allocation bases increases signifi-
cantly for PSIDS and the wider SIDS grouping if allocation is done on a per country 
basis. For SIDS, the per country allocation amount is on average 10 times higher 
if allocation is made on the basis of population, total land area and weighted vul-
nerability. On the other hand, the range of increase varies significantly for PSIDS 
with the per country basis allocation being 23 times more when compared to the 
amount of the population criteria, 10 times more when compared with the total 
land area criteria and 29 times more when compared with weighted vulnerability.
At the regional level, the impact of the four allocation criteria within the PSIDS 
is also quite significant across countries and allocation criteria (Figure 2). Within 
the PSIDS, if the GCF allocations were made on the basis of population, those 
PSIDS categorised as Pacific Smaller Island States (PSIS)4 would be the most 
disadvantaged as they only account for 0.03 percent of the Pacific’s population. 
Niue would be most deprived PSIDS if allocations were to be done on a population 
basis, because its total population is less than 2000. Timor-Leste, Fiji, Solomon 
and, to some extent, Vanuatu would experience small but significant climate finance 
flow due to their high population. PNG, the most populous PSIDS (~64 percent 
of Pacific population), stands to gain the most adaptation finance in the region.  
Papua New Guinea would also benefit the most should the GCF decide to 
allocate adaptation finance on the basis of land area as it accounts for more than 
85 percent of the total land area in the Pacific. While other larger PSIDS such as 
  Figure 1: Average allocations by vulnerable country grouping
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Timor-Leste, Fiji, Solomon and Vanuatu, might also receive significant inflows 
of adaptation finance, the difference in the ratio between the amounts they receive 
with that of PNG under such allocation is quite significant (~ 25 times). The PSIS 
whose combined land area only accounts for 0.01 percent of the total land area in the 
Pacific would be the most penalised under this allocation criterion. Moreover, the 
ratio of the aggregated allocation amount of PSIS when compared to that of other 
bigger PSIDS is also quite substantial. Larger PSIDS could receive up to 28 times 
more adaptation finance under such allocations when compared with PSIS. This 
difference increases exponentially when compared with that of PNG’s allocations.
The impact of a possible allocation based on weighted vulnerability signifi-
cantly varies among PSIDS when compared against their possible allocations 
under the population and total land area criterion. Under these terms, Fiji, FSM, 
Samoa and Kiribati would each stand to receive an increase of about 200 percent 
in adaptation finance when compared with the amount they could possibly receive 
from the population and land area allocation criteria, while the magnitude of the 
increase in Tonga would be 0.7 percent. 
For the remaining PSIDS, allocation using weighted vulnerability would be 
less when compared with the population and the land area allocations. The most 
notable PSIDS where the weighted vulnerability allocation might result in reduced 
adaptation flows would be PNG, Solomon and Vanuatu (Figure 2). PNG seems to 
be the most sensitive PSIDS under this allocation criterion as its adaptation finance 
could be reduced by 84 percent when compared against the total land area and a 
50 percent reduction when compared against the population allocation criteria. 
However, PNG’s position would still be relatively better off under the weighted 
vulnerability criterion when compared across the wider PSIDS.
  Figure 2: PSIDS share if GCF ring-fenced
Note: Allocation by population, land area, weighted vulnerability and per country basis.
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The per country allocation criteria would be a definite game-changer for all 
the PSIDS. When compared with the other three allocation criteria, all the PSIDS 
stand to gain significant flow of climate finance with an allocation of US$257 
million per country. With the exception of the land area allocation to PNG, the 
difference between the per country allocation to that of population and weighted 
vulnerability would be quite significant across PSIDS. For example, Fiji (the 
second best positioned country behind PNG) would gain 17 times the amount 
of climate finance if allocations were to be done by a per country basis rather 
than population, 19 times when compared with allocation by land area and 10 
times when compared to weighted vulnerability allocations. These ratios are 
much higher for the remaining PSIDS, especially for PSIS.
Figure 2 clearly depicts a high degree of climate finance flow variation to each 
PSIDS under each allocation criteria. It indicates the high sensitivity level of the 
PSIDS to the possible allocation criteria, which are done on the basis of popula-
tion, land-area, weighted vulnerability and a per country basis. While PNG, Fiji, 
Solomon, Timor-Lester and Vanuatu are in a much better position to leverage these 
allocation criteria, the amount they could receive however, varies significantly 
depending on the allocation criteria used. Allocations to PSIS are significantly 
less when compared to other PSIDS, but they could receive large and predictable 
scale finance if allocation were done on a per country basis.
The effect of GCF finances on existing finance flows
The impact of the GCF on the existing scale of PSIDS adaptation finance flows 
was also examined using the 2016 Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) data. The OECD database comprehensively tracked the cli-
mate finance flow to all developing countries. In computing the effect, the OECD 
adaptation flow was calculated as a ratio of the finance figure derived from this 
study’s post-2020 allocation criteria. Ratios 1> indicate that the GCF allocations 
will have an impact on current level of financing. While the 2016 flows are not 
fully comparable with the GCF 2020 flow prediction, the aim is to try and identify 
the significance of the GCF instrument compared with existing climate finance 
targeted at adaptation, rather than making any precise comparisons.
If the GCF allocation is done by population, the existing adaptation for 80 
percent of PSIDS does not surpass the ratio of 1, suggesting that the level of 
finance that these PSIDS will receive, might be no greater than what they already 
received as adaptation finance in 2016 (Figure 3). Only three PSIDS—PNG, Fiji 
and the Marshall Islands—are poised to experience an increase of more than 100 
percent in existing finance. PNG stands to gain more than five times its exist-
ing adaptation finance if allocation is done on the basis of population. Existing 
adaptation finance for PNG would increase 16 times if allocation is done on a 
total land area basis. 
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In terms of weighted vulnerability criteria, PNG, Fiji and Solomon Islands’ ex-
isting adaptation finance increases by more than 100 percent. PNG will benefit 
the most among the PSIDS as its existing adaptation finance increases more 
than six times. FSM, Samoa, Marshall, Kiribati, Tonga and Vanuatu are likely 
to also experience an increase in their adaptation finance. The PSIDS did not 
experience a significant increase in their existing adaptation finance, which 
could be largely attributed to the minimal amount of adaptation finance they 
have been receiving and their small population base. 
  Figure 3: GCF ring-fenced allocation as PICs ratio
Note: A ratio of the PICs existing adaptation flow.
  Figure 4: Ratio of maximum, minimum allocations
Note: Allocations across the GNI of vulnerable countries.
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On a per country allocation, the existing adaptation finance across most of the 
PSIDS increases significantly. The PSIS existing climate finances would increase 
significantly under this allocation criteria; for Nauru this increase is projected to 
be 600 times greater. For non PSIS, the degree of funding increase would also be 
significant ‘as on average՚ the existing climate finance would increase 10 times on 
a per country basis.
The effects of the proposed allocation criteria for particularly vulnerable 
countries’ development are summarised in (Figure 4). To highlight the sensitiv-
ity of the four allocation criteria to a country’s development status, this study 
calculated the maximum as well as the minimum allocation across the alloca-
tion criteria and then computed the ratio. The ratio was then graphed against 
the country’s 2016 gross national income (GNI) provided by the World Bank.
The potential financial flows (Figure 4) are more stable across the LDCs and the 
African States. This seems to suggest that, even though LDCs and most of the 
African States are fairly poor, the potential amount that they stood to gain from 
any potential GCF allocation criteria would be more predictable compared to 
the SIDS. The data also suggest that PSIDS are more sensitive to any GCF 
allocation criteria despite their relatively affluent economies. PSIS are most 
sensitive to potential allocation criteria of the GCF. PSIDS high reliance on 
external support suggests that the GCF allocation criteria really matter in their 
development context and this dependence is even more critical in the context of 
PSIS. The potential of the GCF to support adaptation endeavours is thus much 
more uncertain for PSIS.
Discussion
As the GCF mobilises towards 2020, once countries have established access 
channels and become conversant in the access process, the GCF is likely to be 
oversubscribed and will need to address allocation issues. The analyses highlight-
ed above are some key indicative scenarios, based on the equity principle to help 
elaborate the significance of potential future GCF adaptation flows to PSIDS. 
For the GCF, finding equitable and fair criteria by which to allocate adapta-
tion finance in a manner that will satisfy all the particularly vulnerable coun-
tries will be difficult. At the international level, equitable criteria based on the 
prioritarianism principle will favour larger, populous LDCs and African States 
relative to the SIDS. This trend is also reflected at the regional level, where the 
finance allocations are also skewed towards more populous and bigger PSIDS. 
Only the equality principle seems to guarantee that predictable adaptation finance 
will flow to all PSIDS.
The analyses also identify PSIDS as being very sensitive to any allocation 
criteria by the GCF, which increases the uncertainty of predictable climate fi-
nance flow. Depending on the allocation criteria adopted by the GCF, the existing 
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climate finance flow to PSIDS can be significantly scaled-up, or can remain largely 
unchanged; this is likely to have serious implications on their resilience develop-
ment pathways.
Accessing the GCF ring-fenced adaptation fund is further complicated 
because the 15 PSIDS will still have to compete with 84 other countries. In a 
competitive funding environment, PSIDS are more likely to be under-funded 
because the existing process of the GCF emphasises the need for ‘paradigm 
shift-oriented projects’ (GCF, 2018a). This means that the GCF will prioritise 
the quality of the funding proposal over a country’s special circumstances. With 
chronic shortages of local specialists who are competent in writing and designing 
quality funding proposals, PSIDS will struggle to compete for GCF funding. 
Conclusion 
This study supports the growing voice of concern that the GCF needs to do more 
for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to climate change. The 
critical question this study raises is in relation to post-2020 funding allocation of 
the GCF, which has received very little attention in the public discourse. There is 
a critical need to initiate frank and open discussion on the future allocation policy 
of the GCF, as many developing countries are currently prioritising national ac-
creditation, but paying little attention to post-2020 allocation. 
The Pacific Small Island Developing States stand out as being extremely 
sensitive to potential shifts in GCF post-2020 allocation. Apart from the equality 
principle, any equitable allocation criterion that promotes the prioritarianism prin-
ciple seems to indicate that the access to predictable finance promises of the GCF 
is highly uncertain. While strengthening institutional capacities will benefit PSIDS 
in pursuing direct access to the GCF, the broad allocation policy of the GCF and 
its competitive funding-oriented criteria raise legitimate questions about whether 
pursuing national accreditation is worthwhile for PSIDS, especially the PSIS. 
To reduce the uncertainty associated with the post-2020 GCF climate finance 
flows, this article suggests that the GCF needs to consider a uniform funding floor 
per country within the GCF ring-fenced provision, in order to ensure a predictable 
resourcing pathway for the small and the particularly vulnerable countries.
To conclude, there is an urgent need for the media community in the Pacific 
to advocate more effectively for climate change issues in the region, in particular 
in relation to climate finance. The Pacific media must do more to provoke discus-
sions in all aspects of climate change, especially those future issues that can have 
long term implications. As Robie argues: 
We are running out of time… [and] news media itself is not terribly good 
when it comes to long-term issues. It tends to respond to immediate issues 
and consequences. It lacks the attention span for longer term challenges. (Asia 
Pacific media must ‘empower people’, 2018) 
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The GCF future allocation policy is a critical long term issue that is imperative 
to discuss publicly because further delays will only increase the probability that 
the urgent needs of some PSIDS will be ignored. 
Notes
1. Accreditation refers to the evaluation process that international, regional, and national 
institutions have to go through if they want to directly access the GCF. To be accredited, 
an institution has to meet the robust standards required by the GCF.
2. From 2020 to 2025, the goal is to mobilise US$100 billion of climate finance each 
year. A new climate finance goal is expected to be determined in 2025.
3. Ninety seven developing countries who are parties to the UNFCCC fit the requirements 
of the special ring-fenced portion of the GCF adaptation finance.
4. This grouping is exclusive to six Pacific Smaller Island States (PSIS)—Cook Islands, 
Nauru, Niue, Palau, Republic of the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu. These islands are 
made up of low-lying atolls.
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